ATLAS v4.6.0 added 14 new agentic AI techniques, bringing the total to 15 tactics, 66 techniques, and 46 sub-techniques. AATMF v3 provides finer-grained coverage:
AATMF is designed to be complementary to ATLAS, not competitive. ATLAS provides breadth across the ML lifecycle; AATMF provides depth on adversarial attack techniques with executable procedures.
The preliminary draft (December 2025) establishes control overlays for AI systems. AATMF maps to NIST functions:
Part 26: Training and Awareness Programs
Role-Based Training Matrix
| Audience |
Content Focus |
Duration |
Frequency |
| Executive leadership |
AI risk landscape, AATMF overview, regulatory exposure |
2 hours |
Quarterly |
| ML engineers |
T1–T6 techniques, secure training, model hardening |
2 days |
Semi-annual |
| Application developers |
T1–T5, T11 (agentic), API security, prompt injection defense |
1 day |
Semi-annual |
| Security operations |
Detection engineering, IR procedures, all tactics overview |
2 days |
Semi-annual |
| Data scientists |
T6 (training poisoning), T12 (RAG), data provenance |
1 day |
Annual |
| Product managers |
Risk assessment, compliance requirements, threat landscape |
4 hours |
Annual |
| All staff |
AI security awareness, social engineering with AI, Shadow AI risks |
1 hour |
Annual |
Tabletop Exercise Scenarios
Scenario 1: GTG-1002 Redux (Agentic Exploitation)
A developer reports that their AI coding assistant has been making unexpected network calls. Investigation reveals that a compromised MCP server has been redirecting the agent to exfiltrate source code. The attack has been active for approximately 72 hours.
Discussion points: Detection gap analysis, containment procedures for agentic systems, MCP audit process, developer notification.
Scenario 2: PoisonedRAG (Knowledge Base Manipulation)
Customer support reports that the AI assistant is providing incorrect information about product pricing and warranty terms. Analysis shows that 5 malicious documents were injected into the RAG knowledge base 2 weeks ago, affecting approximately 15% of queries.
Discussion points: RAG integrity monitoring, customer notification, knowledge base rebuild, source authentication.
Scenario 3: Supply Chain Compromise
A widely-used LoRA adapter on HuggingFace has been updated with a backdoor. Your team deployed this adapter 3 days ago in a fine-tuned model serving 50,000 daily users.
Discussion points: Model artifact verification, rollback procedures, user impact assessment, responsible disclosure.
Scenario 4: Policy Puppetry at Scale
Security monitoring detects a 500% increase in safety filter bypasses. Investigation reveals a new jailbreak technique (formatted as XML policy files) that bypasses all current input classifiers. The technique has been publicly shared on social media.
Discussion points: Emergency filter updates, temporary service restrictions, public communication, patch timeline.
Scenario 5: Deepfake Board Member
A board member received a video call from the "CFO" requesting approval for a $5M wire transfer. The call lasted 15 minutes and included realistic video and audio. The board member approved the transfer before verification.
Discussion points: Multi-factor verification for financial decisions, deepfake detection capabilities, insurance coverage, incident response.
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roval for a $5M wire transfer. The call lasted 15 minutes and included realistic video and audio. The board member approved the transfer before verification.